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POLITICAL CONTROL OF 
FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS: 
LOOKING BACK AND  
LOOKING FORWARD 
DANIEL RICHMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  This Essay explores the mechanisms of control over federal 
criminal enforcement that the administration and Congress used or 
failed to use during George W. Bush’s presidency. It gives particular 
attention to Congress, not because legislators played a dominant role, 
but because they generally chose to play such a subordinate role. My 
fear is that the media focus on management inadequacies or abuses 
within the Justice Department during the Bush administration might 
lead policymakers and observers to overlook the hard questions that 
remain about how the federal criminal bureaucracy should be 
structured and guided during a period of rapidly shifting priorities 
and about the role Congress should play in this process. 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal criminal enforcement bureaucracy casts a large 
shadow because of the conspicuous cases it occasionally pursues and 
the attention the national media gives to the work of the storied 
“feds.” When clear or suspected criminality looms large in the 
national consciousness—whether in the form of violent gangs or 
shenanigans in the credit default swap market—calls for Justice 
Department action grow loud. Yet this bureaucracy is relatively 
small—relative both to the other criminal justice operations and to 
the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. 
Although the department’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. 
(often called “Main Justice”), contains a number of litigating divisions 
 
Copyright © 2009 by Daniel Richman. 
 † Professor, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Sam Buell, Deborah Denno, and the 
members of her Advanced Criminal Law seminar at Fordham Law School, Geoff Moulton, 
Kate Stith, Jonathan Williams, and some extremely informative people who asked to remain 
anonymous. 
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(including the Criminal Division), most cases are brought by the 
nearly 5,800 prosecutors in the ninety-three United States Attorneys’ 
offices (who are not formally within the Criminal Division).1 That 
sounds like a large force until one remembers that the five district 
attorneys’ offices in New York City have a total of 1,727 prosecutors.2 
This comparison actually understates the boutique nature of the 
federal system and the uneven distribution of its work. Nearly 68,000 
federal criminal cases were filed in 2007.3 But almost 17,000 of these 
were immigration cases4 (not including nearly 2,000 identification 
fraud cases5); over 17,000 were narcotics cases,6 and over 8,000 were 
firearms cases.7 What about white-collar crime? Federal prosecutors 
filed seventy securities fraud cases in 2007,8 569 financial institution 
fraud cases,9 and 804 mail and wire fraud cases.10 But even the 
combined total of these is smaller than the number of pornography 
cases (1,544) pursued that year.11 
If anything, the focus on immigration cases has increased, with a 
2008 report finding that they amounted to 49.2 percent of all federal 
prosecutions.12 Child pornography cases are up as well.13 The 
 
 1. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 09-03, 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ OFFICES 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/EOUSA/a0903/final.pdf (reporting that 5,381 United States 
Attorneys and Assistant United States Attorneys were employed as of April 21, 2008). 
 2. NYLJ 100: District Attorneys’ Offices, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.nylawyer. 
com/adgifs/decisions/120808magchart7.pdf (giving totals for the five counties that comprise New 
York City). 
 3. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS 226 tbl.D-2 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/ 
JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. 
 4. Id. at 228 tbl.D-2. 
 5. Id. at 227 tbl.D-2. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 226 tbl.D-2. 
 9. Id. For a sense of the kinds of charges brought in corporate fraud cases, see 
CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1.3–.23 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-fraud2008.pdf. 
 10. See DUFF, supra note 3, at 226 tbl.D-2 (noting that there were a total of 464 mail fraud 
cases and 340 wire, radio, or television fraud cases in 2007). 
 11. Id. at 228 tbl.D-2. 
 12. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Reports, Prosecutions Through June 
2008, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/198 (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 13. See Amir Efrati, Making Punishments Fit the Most Offensive Crimes—Societal 
Revulsion at Child-Pornography Consumers Has Led to Stiff Prison Sentences—And Caused 
Some Judges to Rebel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008, at A14 (“In fiscal 2008, U.S. attorneys’ offices 
brought 2,211 computer-based child exploitation cases, the vast majority against child 
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commitment of federal enforcement resources to these cases came 
while the Justice Department’s only unit with authority over the full 
range of federal cases—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)14—
was working hard to recenter itself on counterterrorism programs.15 In 
the midst of this recentering has come an economic crisis, 
accompanied by heavy pressure on the FBI to pursue those with 
criminal responsibility for it.16 The federal system has always been in 
flux, but never more so than in the past eight years.17 
Enforcer discretion—exercised by prosecutors and investigative 
agents—has always lain at the heart of federal criminal law, which has 
 
pornography viewers, who mostly pleaded guilty. That was more than double the number five 
years earlier.”). 
 14. See 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 242, 243 (1996), 1996 WL 33101185, at *1 (“[28 U.S.C. § 
533] confers on the Attorney General broad general investigative authority with respect to 
federal criminal offenses. . . . [and she] has delegated her investigative authority to the FBI.” 
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 15. See Federal Bureau of Investigation (Part II): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 20 (2008) (statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation) (“In recent years, we have moved away from drug cases and smaller white 
collar crimes, but we have dedicated more agents and more resources to public corruption, 
violent crime, civil rights, transnational organized crime, corporate fraud, and crimes against 
children.”); Kelly Thornton, Without Lam, U.S. Attorney’s Office Takes Different Tack, 
VOICEOFSANDIEGO.ORG, Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/articles/2008/12/02/ 
news/01usa120308.txt (reporting a substantial increase in immigration cases and a decrease in 
white-collar cases in San Diego); see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, AUDIT REP. 05-37, THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION’S REPRIORITIZATION EFFORTS i (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
oig/reports/FBI/a0537/final.pdf (detailing a three-year period of transformation at the FBI 
“aimed at focusing the agency on terrorism and intelligence-related matters”); U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FBI TRANSFORMATION: FBI CONTINUES TO MAKE PROGRESS IN ITS 
EFFORT TO TRANSFORM AND ADDRESS PRIORITIES 20 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d04578t.pdf (“Since September 11, the FBI has permanently realigned a substantial 
number of its field agents from traditional criminal investigative programs to work on 
counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations.”). 
 16. See Eric Lichtblau, David Johnson & Ron Nixon, F.B.I. Struggling to Handle Wave of 
Finance Cases: Few Agents Available; Focus on Terror Limits Resources to Pursue Fraud 
Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A1 (“Current and former officials say the cutbacks 
[done to shift agents into national security programs] have left the bureau seriously exposed in 
investigating areas like white-collar crime, which has taken on urgent importance in recent 
weeks because of the nation’s economic woes.”); Karen Donovan, Law and Financial Disorder; 
Despite Calls for C.E.O. Perp Walks, Building a Criminal Case Will Be Very Difficult, 
PORTFOLIO.COM, Dec. 28, 2008, http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/top-5/2008/12/ 
28/Financial-Crime-Prosecutions#page1; Patricia Hurtado, FBI Uses Triage to Shift from Terror 
to Madoff, Subprime Probes, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.bloomberg. 
com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aVHDu98R3s6s&refer=home. 
 17. See Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 
CRIME & JUST. 377, 382–407 (2006) (sketching federal efforts against violent crime from the 
Founding through the September 11, 2001 attacks). 
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long been characterized by extraordinarily broad substantive statutes 
enforced by a relatively small bureaucracy that can pick and choose 
among possible targets.18 Indeed, practitioners and close observers 
have come to see federal criminal law less like a compendium of 
prohibitions than a series of broad criminal jurisdictional grants to 
agencies. Yet even as Congress has been quick to pass broad and 
overlapping criminal statutes, particularly since the 1960s, it has used 
a variety of strategies to influence how and against whom federal 
criminal resources get deployed. During the eight years of George W. 
Bush’s administration, Congress passed criminal statutes with its 
usual abandon.19 What was remarkable, however, was the 
extraordinary extent to which legislators—at least until 2006—
acquiesced in executive projects of centralization and politicization 
that threatened Congress’s long-term institutional interests. 
This Essay’s exploration of the institutional dynamics within and 
around the Justice Department during the Bush administration 
focuses on Congress in part to compensate for all the attention that 
Justice Department officials—and the White House personnel to 
whom they were all too subservient—have received in the past year 
or so. It is not that these officials—both those who left in disgrace, 
like Alberto Gonzales, Kyle Sampson, and Monica Goodling, and 
those who acquitted themselves with distinct honor, like James 
Comey—do not deserve the attention. Rather, I worry that the ease 
with which some of the Bush administration pathologies can be 
identified—the attorney general who had barely a clue of what was 
 
 18. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the 
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 611 (2005) (“Little 
responsibility and vast jurisdiction mean that federal law enforcers must exercise an 
extraordinary degree of investigative and prosecutorial discretion in deciding when, and against 
whom, to invoke that jurisdiction.”); see also Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1514 (2008) (“Prosecutors exert enormous influence over the path of 
substantive criminal law.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of 
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 880 (2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114172 (“Congress . . . routinely passes laws with punishments greater 
than the facts of the offense would demand to allow prosecutors to use the excessive 
punishments as bargaining chips and to obtain what prosecutors and Congress would view as the 
more appropriate sentence via a plea instead of a trial.”). 
 19. See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., HERITAGE FOUND., LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 26, 
REVISITING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIMES 5 (2008), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/legalissues/upload/lm_26.pdf (“Since the start of 2000, 
Congress has created at least 452 new crimes.”). Among the most recent enactments is the 
Animal Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-22, 121 Stat. 88 (to be 
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1 note). 
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going on in his department20 or of the difference between his job and 
that of White House counsel;21 decisions to fire U.S. Attorneys that 
lacked clear decisionmakers and were heavily influenced by the pique 
of staffers;22 and career-prosecutor hiring processes that flagrantly 
disregarded civil service law23—may lead policymakers and observers 
to overlook the hard questions that remain about how the federal 
criminal bureaucracy should be structured and guided. 
Analytically, one would like to separate conversations about how 
power should be allocated within and outside the Justice Department 
from those about enforcement priorities. Indeed, that is the approach 
generally taken.24 One of the goals of this Essay, however, is to show 
how decisions about enforcement-power allocation have—during the 
Bush administration and probably inevitably—been inextricably 
intertwined with preferences about priorities and the vigor with which 
they are pursued. 
 
 20. David Johnston & Eric Lipton, Gonzales Endures Harsh Session with Senate Panel; 
Doubt Is Raised About Honesty and Judgment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A1 (noting how 
during his “more than five hours of often-combative testimony, Mr. Gonzales . . . struggled to 
offer a coherent explanation for the dismissals” of eight U.S. Attorneys); see also Chitra 
Ragavan, The Embattled Attorney General; Gonzales Still Has the President’s Support, For Now, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 30, 2007, at 34, 35 (noting how, at the Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearing, there were “seventy-one times in all” that Gonzales “fell back on a 
misfiring memory”). 
 21. See Katy J. Harriger, Executive Power and Prosecution: Lessons from the Libby Trial 
and the U.S. Attorney Firings, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 491, 503 (2008) (“Career officials 
within the department described [Gonzales’s] tenure as one in which political considerations 
seemed to drive most decision making and in which the traditional notion of ‘independence’ of 
the department was severely undermined.”); Chitra Ragavan, A General Rebellion; Alberto 
Gonzales Has Big Troubles, But It Isn’t the Current Flap That Has Made Him Such a 
Controversial Figure, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 9, 2007, at 30, 32 (noting the “view 
among many career prosecutors that Gonzales is too close to Bush”). 
 22. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006, 
at 15–51 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf. 
 23. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA 
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 25–35 (2008), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf. 
 24. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 989, 996 (2006) (advocating a “‘formalist’ approach to separation of powers [in the 
criminal law context], where legislative, executive, and judicial powers are to be separated and 
novel arrangements that allow a blending of functions or weakening of one branch’s power are 
disallowed”); Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating Interpretive Criminal-Lawmaking Power Within the 
Executive Branch, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 48 (Winter 1998) (proposing “[f]ormally 
investing DOJ with interpretive lawmaking power” without discussing substantive enforcement 
priorities). 
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I.  CONGRESS AND DELEGATED FEDERAL  
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 
Back in 1999, a more-than-casual observer could look past the 
extraordinary, ostensible delegation of congressional power to the 
executive and the federal judiciary entailed by broad federal criminal 
statutes and suggest that Congress had actually not been so profligate 
with its legislative authority.25 The reach of the mail and wire fraud 
statutes26 (to take just two examples) is enormous, as is the risk their 
misuse could chill socially and economically valuable conduct and 
even threaten longstanding political norms.27 Yet to look solely at 
substantive federal criminal law would lead one to seriously 
underestimate “the richness of Congress’s interactions with the 
federal enforcement apparatus and the extent to which enforcers’ 
decisions are likely to reflect legislative preferences.”28 
That Congress regularly eschewed legislative specificity in its 
substantive lawmaking did not mean it had abandoned the field. 
Indeed, there was “considerable evidence that legislators [were] well 
aware of how to constrain enforcer discretion and [were] willing to do 
 
 25. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement 
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 811 (1999) (arguing that “those who would claim, based on 
substantive law, that Congress has utterly failed to restrain prosecutorial discretion . . . [are] 
looking in the wrong place” because “[i]n Congress’s structuring of and interactions with the law 
enforcement bureaucracy, one sees clear moves to influence how law enforcement officials 
exercise delegated authority”); see also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal 
Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 471–88 (1996) (noting the breadth of congressional delegation of 
criminal lawmaking authority to agencies and courts). 
 26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 & 1346 (2006). 
 27. For commentary on the breadth of federal mail and wire fraud, see Samuel W. Buell, 
Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1987–88 (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort 
to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic 
Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117, 126–30 (1981); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427 
passim (1998). Circuits vary on the precise breadth of the honest services provision. Compare 
United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d. 1237, 1248 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 
1346—the “honest services” provision applicable to federal mail and wire fraud—establishes a 
“uniform standard . . . that governs every public official” regardless of whether state law was 
violated), with United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 733–34 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[I]f the official 
does all that is required under state law, alleging that the services were not otherwise done 
‘honestly’ does not charge a violation of the mail fraud statute.”). Justice Scalia recently 
bemoaned the conflicts among the circuits on this issue. Sorich v. United States, No. 08-410, slip 
op. at 3 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 28. Richman, supra note 25, at 788; see also DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, 
DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING 
UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 213 (1999) (“Legislators may cede authority to bureaucratic actors, 
but they also monitor the use of their authority to keep executive agents in line.”). 
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so when they deem[ed] it appropriate.”29 By strategically using 
oversight hearings, budgetary controls, agency design, and restrictions 
on investigative options, legislators could moderate enforcement in 
sensitive areas without sacrificing the symbolic and deterrent benefits 
of broad prohibitions and without tackling the challenges of ex ante 
specification. Internal Revenue Service officials could periodically be 
raked over the coals for overzealous tactics.30 Enforcement of federal 
gun laws could be assigned to a politically vulnerable agency with a 
small portfolio.31 Conversely, legislators could use an agency’s small 
portfolio as a means of ensuring continued enforcement zeal—one 
reason the Drug Enforcement Administration has survived repeated 
consolidation attempts.32 
One potential strategy for influencing the exercise of delegated 
executive power, however, was notable for its relatively infrequent 
use. Because Congress could directly regulate decisionmaking in far-
flung U.S. Attorneys’ offices only by acting through the Justice 
Department’s leadership in Washington, one might have expected 
that legislators would encourage, even require, centralized control 
over the districts.33 Indeed, in a few areas—most notably criminal civil 
rights enforcement—the Justice Department itself ensured that 
particularly expansive statutes would not be deployed without the 
participation of a Main Justice component.34 Yet the involvement of 
even the Criminal Division in cases not handled by the division itself 
was the exception rather than the rule. And although Congress from 
time to time mandated Washington’s involvement or approval, 
 
 29. Richman, supra note 25, at 810; see also Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1559–60 (2008) (explaining how Congress can employ institutional 
design strategies, including budget manipulation and other forms of legislative oversight, to 
control enforcer discretion). 
 30. Richman, supra note 25, at 791. 
 31. See id. at 796–98. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fireams and Explosives (ATF) has 
since been shifted from the Treasury Department to the Justice Department but remains quite 
separate from the FBI. See Jerry Markon, FBI, ATF Battle for Control of Cases, WASH. POST, 
May 10, 2008, at A1 (reporting the turf fight between the FBI and ATF over which agency will 
be in charge of explosives cases that might be linked to terrorism). 
 32. Richman, supra note 25, at 795–96. 
 33. See id. at 802–03. For discussions by the leading political scientist in the area about the 
role that U.S. Attorneys’ offices play in the federal enforcement system, see generally JAMES 
EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND 
LEGAL SYSTEMS (1978); James Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings of 2006: Main Justice’s 
Centralization Efforts in Historical Context, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 219, 221–23 (2008). 
 34. Richman, supra note 25, at 798–99; see also id. at 802 (noting the administratively 
imposed approval requirement for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations cases). 
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legislators were surprisingly loath to enlist Washington to manage 
field operations. 
The explanation for this congressional reluctance seemed to lie 
both in the risks—from an institutional perspective—of centralized 
control and in the concomitant institutional benefits from 
localization. Any legislative effort to address the agency problems 
inherent in the historically decentralized U.S. Attorney system would 
“have the unfortunate effect of rendering enforcement more 
amenable to control by the attorney general and, ultimately, the 
president.”35 Moreover, congressional efforts to foster the autonomy, 
or least semi-independence, of U.S. Attorneys’ offices were not 
simply a matter of limiting an administration’s ability to use 
enforcement assets to further political goals. Legislators also seemed 
to value district autonomy for its own sake, as a potential source of 
personal leverage and of localized benefits to their constituents. After 
all, many of them had played a role in the selection of the local U.S. 
Attorney.36 They could also be confident that the U.S. Attorney, in 
her staff and in her caseload, would be enmeshed in the local political 
establishment, responsive to the needs of local needs, and amenable 
to letting local legislators take some credit for helping to address 
those needs.37 
II.  CONGRESSIONAL QUIESCENCE DURING  
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
At the start, the Bush administration did not seem particularly 
committed to centralized management. “Following the precedent set 
by the Clinton Administration in 1993, though with somewhat less 
speed, the Administration asked for the resignations of nearly all the 
U.S. Attorneys.”38 The new appointees, however, seemed to reflect 
 
 35. Id. at 812; see also DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY 
DESIGN 28–29 (2003) (discussing congressional efforts to insulate agencies from presidential 
control). 
 36. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 33, at 35–53; Richman, supra note 25, at 785; see also 
DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND 
BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 65 (2008) (“Members of Congress repeatedly refused to give 
up control over regional appointments, such as U.S. Marshals, U.S. Attorneys, and regional 
USDA officials, because those persons would set policy regionally in a way that was sensitive to 
the needs of a members’ [sic] reelection coalition.”). 
 37. See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 788 (2003). 
 38. Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—The Center 
Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1382 (2008). 
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the usual degree of senatorial participation.39 Indeed, one of the most 
conspicuous importations of a U.S. Attorney from out of the district 
was done at the behest of a local senator—when Senator Peter 
Fitzgerald brought Patrick Fitzgerald (no relation) in from New York 
to preside over the dizzying array of high-level corruption 
investigations in Chicago.40 One might have read into the new 
administration’s embrace of the “unitary executive” theory41 a 
commitment to hierarchical control. Yet Clinton administration 
theorists had embraced the same notion,42 and its Justice Department 
was notable for its lack of centralized control in criminal matters.43 
The attacks on September 11, 2001, made terrorism prevention 
the department’s top priority and gave Washington a keen interest in 
managing (or appearing to manage) terrorism cases nationwide.44 
Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff—who, as head of the 
Criminal Division, would not normally have exercised hierarchical 
authority over the districts—presided over this centripetal reaction 
and took on an unprecedented operational role.45 Yet even in the 
 
 39. Although the Constitution calls for the Senate to provide “advice and consent,” U.S. 
CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2, the usual process is for a home-state Senator to propose candidates to 
the president, EISENSTEIN, supra note 33, at 43. “When both senators belong to the other party, 
the department consults state party leaders and members of the House of Representatives on 
appointments.” Id. at 45. The Bush administration appears to have continued this tradition. 
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO 
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO THE SELECTION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY FOR GUAM AND THE 
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 6–7 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/ 
s0606a/final.pdf. For examples of how the process played out in the appointments of Todd 
Graves in the Western District of Missouri, David Iglesias in the District of New Mexico, and 
Daniel Bogden in the District of Nevada, see OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 100, 149–50, 201. 
 40. See John Kass, Tale of 2 Fitzgeralds: A Gloves-Off Story, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 10, 2006, at 
2. 
 41. See Richman, supra note 38, at 1382 n.25 (citing presentations and critiques of this 
theory). 
 42. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248–58 (2001). 
 43. Richman, supra note 38, at 1380–82. 
 44. United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Mich. 2003), offers a sense of the 
intensity with which the department’s highest officials monitored one terrorism trial, see id. at 
724–38; see also Richard B. Schmidt, Terrorism Trial Triumph Turns into an Embarrassment, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at A20 (discussing the launch of a special investigation responding to 
allegations that an Assistant U.S. Attorney withheld exculpatory evidence in that same 
terrorism prosecution). 
 45. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 12–15 (2003), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf. 
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post-9/11 world, the Justice Department’s leadership still seemed to 
appreciate the virtues of decentralization in at least one critical 
area—corporate fraud. To be sure, the investigation of Enron 
executives and others implicated in the collapse of that energy firm 
was handled by a special task force operating out of the Criminal 
Division—ostensibly because the entire Southern District of Texas 
U.S. Attorney’s office was conflicted out,46 but more likely, in the 
opinion of one task force member, because Chertoff “wanted to 
maintain closer control over the pace and strategy of the investigation 
than would have been possible had it been assigned to New York,” 
where venue was also available.47 Otherwise the George W. Bush 
Justice Department responded to other widely reported financial 
scandals in much the same way as the George H.W. Bush Justice 
Department responded to the savings and loan scandals of the early 
1990s: the political leadership in Washington would take on the roles 
of cheerleader and banner cutter, but actual prosecutions would be 
left to the districts whenever possible.48 Although rolled out with 
considerable fanfare in 2002,49 the vaunted Corporate Fraud Task 
Force was mostly “a branding device that allowed the Administration 
to take political credit for the far-flung activities of the districts 
without taking on much responsibility or operational control.”50 
 
 46. See, e.g., Paul Duggan, Tex. Prosecutors Disqualified from Probe by Personal Ties; U.S. 
Attorney Launched Inquiry into Enron Only to Be Recused, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2002, at A6; 
David Johnston, Justice Dept.’s Inquiry into Enron Is Beginning to Take Shape, Without Big 
Names, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at C7 (“With Attorney General John Ashcroft and virtually 
the entire legal staff of the United States attorney’s office in Houston disqualified from the 
Enron criminal investigation, the Justice Department has been forced to rapidly assemble a 
pickup team of prosecutors and investigators to unravel Enron’s collapse.”). 
 47. See John R. Kroger, Remarks: Enron and Multi-Jurisdictional Fraud, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1657, 1659 (2007). 
 48. See Kitty Calavita & Henry N. Pontell, The State and White-Collar Crime: Saving the 
Savings and Loans, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 297, 301–02 (1994) (stating that, “hop[ing] to gain 
political mileage,” President George H.W. Bush and Congress devoted “considerable attention 
to the savings and loan fraud” by providing a generous funding for the Justice Department’s 
prosecutorial efforts); see also Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Enforcement 
Response to the S & L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S155, S170–71 (1991) (describing 
congressional efforts to encourage the Justice Department to exercise “plenary enforcement” of 
banking crime provisions). 
 49. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Remarks on Corporate Responsibility in New York City, 38 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1158, 1160 (July 9, 2002) (announcing the establishment of the 
Corporate Fraud Task Force). 
 50. Richman, supra note 38, at 1383; see also Daphne Eviatar, Case Closed?, AM. LAW., 
Fall 2007, at 19, 24 (“Many prosecutors say that while Justice officials turned up for press 
conferences at which corporate fraud indictments were announced, they typically provided little 
assistance in the actual prosecutions.”). 
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Terrorism investigations aside (quite a large caveat), it thus did not 
initially seem that the George W. Bush Justice Department would 
radically differ from the Clinton department in how it sought to 
allocate authority between the center and the periphery. 
It was not long, however, before the department’s political 
leadership embarked on a sustained campaign to more actively 
manage prosecutorial decisionmaking across all districts in all cases. 
From this distance, it is difficult to discern the precise sequence or 
nature of all the measures this effort encompassed. Evidence of the 
degree to which Main Justice officials closely monitored district 
prosecution data in gun and immigration cases, for example, has 
emerged only as a result of the probes into the late-2006 U.S. 
Attorney firings,51 and the disclosures the department made in those 
inquiries are not likely to have covered all such monitoring (since that 
was not the focus of the inquiries).52 Although we know, for example, 
that “[i]n early 2004, the Office of the Attorney General began to 
identify those United States Attorneys’ offices that it believed were 
‘underperforming’ in implementing” the department’s gun-
prosecution program,53 the extent of the pressure on districts to fill 
numerical quotas (or goals) for other sorts of cases cannot be 
determined. 
What is far clearer is the extent to which the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and the data that compliance with them generated seemed 
to facilitate (and perhaps fostered) this attempt at active 
management. The guidelines themselves, which explicitly constrained 
sentencing judges,54 did not inevitably constrain prosecutors. And 
 
 51. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra 
note 22, at 1 (recounting how, after learning “in late 2006 and early 2007” that nine U.S. 
Attorneys had been directed by senior Justice Department officials to resign—seven on 
December 7, 2006, and two “earlier in 2006”—“members of Congress began to raise questions 
and concerns about the reasons for the removals, including whether they were intended to 
influence certain prosecutions”). 
 52. See Richman, supra note 38, at 1385. 
 53. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, 
at 273. 
 54. Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 
1837, 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.), federal judges were 
required to apply the Sentencing Guidelines that the U.S. Sentencing Commission promulgated. 
For excellent accounts of the initiation and development of the federal guidelines system, see 
generally KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998); Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM L. REV. 1315 (2005). In Booker v. United States, 
543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional those parts of the Sentencing 
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they did not particularly do so under Attorney General Janet Reno, 
whose directives allowed the districts, and the line prosecutors within 
them, considerable discretion in the plea dispositions that they 
negotiated.55 Yet practice under the guidelines held out the promise, 
to an administration so inclined, of an executive management tool 
that might give distant overseers a metric for assessing what kinds of 
cases were being pursued and with what intensity.56 
The Bush administration was indeed inclined, and it had willing 
helpmates in Congress. In 2003, the Feeney Amendment to the 
PROTECT Act57 tightened the appellate standard of review for all 
judicial departures from the Sentencing Guidelines and called on the 
Justice Department “to take a more aggressive role in policing 
guidelines compliance resisting downward departures ‘not supported 
by the facts and the law.’”58 Although the initiative seemed to come 
from Congress, any appearance that legislators were calling the 
department to account was deceptive. The provision’s sponsor, 
Congressman Tom Feeney was simply “carrying water” for a drafting 
group that included Justice Department officials and a former federal 
prosecutor, now House Judiciary staffer, who would soon be hired 
back into the department under the auspices of high departmental 
officials.59 In other aspects of the legislation—such as a provision that 
 
Reform Act that required judges to adhere to the sentencing ranges that the guidelines 
mandated, id. at 244–68. Henceforth, the guidelines were to be only “advisory.” Id. at 245; see 
also Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843–44 (2009) (per curiam) (reaffirming sentencing 
discretion of district judges). 
 55. See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of 
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1441 (2008). 
 56. Richman, supra note 38, at 1387; see also Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, The Use 
and Transformation of Formal Decision-Making Criteria: Sentencing Guidelines, Organizational 
Contexts, and Case Processing Strategies, 45 SOC. PROBS. 248, 262–65 (1998) (discussing how 
state sentencing guidelines can be used by a district attorney’s office as a management tool); cf. 
JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN 
CONDITION HAVE FAILED 44 (1998) (discussing measurement, mapping, and other devices 
states have deployed to make activities and relationships more “legible” and thus more 
amenable to control). 
 57. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, tit. IV, 117 Stat. 650, 667 (2003) (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 3553, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994 (2006)). For the story of the amendment to the 
PROTECT Act that was proposed by Representative Tom Feeney (R-Fla.), see Stephanos 
Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 
94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295–97 (2004). 
 58. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 749, 789 (2006) (quoting PROTECT Act § 401(l)(1)(A), 117 Stat. at 674). 
 59. See Richman, supra note 38, at 1388; see also Michael Gerber, Down with Discretion, 
LEGAL AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 72, 74 (explaining that the primary author of the Feeney 
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restricted the use of fast-track programs for the speedy and lenient 
disposition of certain cases, particularly in the immigration area, to 
those districts that had received explicit permission from the attorney 
general—the administration’s hand was even more evident.60 
Six months later, Attorney General Ashcroft followed up with a 
memorandum enjoining all federal prosecutors to “charge and pursue 
the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are 
supported by the facts of the case, except as authorized by an 
Assistant Attorney General, United States Attorney, or designated 
supervisory attorney” in certain limited circumstances.61 In form, the 
Ashcroft Memorandum presented itself as a laudable effort to 
evenhandedly constrain prosecutors to the same extent as judges 
were already constrained, binding both actors to the available facts 
and guidelines calculations that flowed from them.62 Yet in its design 
and intent, the memorandum, like the Feeney Amendment, presents 
a lovely instance of what Gregory Huber has called strategic 
neutrality—the posture through which an agency advances its 
political ends by “adopting the language of neutrality and efficiency 
at the core of the Weberian account of neutrally competent modern 
bureaucracy.”63 Huber notes how central management can be 
enhanced through “[c]entrally directed and largely uniform field 
implementation,”64 and administrative centralization indeed seems to 
have been a goal here. 
To be sure, the conception of centralized control the Ashcroft 
Memorandum engendered was pretty thin because it gave no 
directives as to case types. Case types are amenable to close statistical 
monitoring, however, and—if the documents disclosed to Congress in 
connection with the U.S. Attorney firings are any indication—
 
Amendment, Jay Apperson, was an “aide to F. James Sensenbrenner, the 13-term Republican 
congressman from Wisconsin who chairs the House Judiciary Committee”). 
 60. Richman, supra note 38, at 1389. 
 61. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm. 
 62. See Bibas, supra note 57, at 301–02; see also Richman, supra note 38, at 1390 (“‘[I]f 
readily provable facts are relevant to calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines, the 
prosecutor must disclose them to the court,’ because prosecutors could not ‘fact bargain, or be 
party to any plea agreement that results in the sentencing court having less than a full 
understanding of all readily provable facts.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Memorandum from John Ashcroft, supra note 61)). 
 63. GREGORY A. HUBER, THE CRAFT OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY: INTERESTS AND 
INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 1 (2007). 
 64. Id. at 26. 
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apparatchiks in the Bush Justice Department did just that. Indeed, 
Carol Lam, the U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of California 
was put on the removal list and fired “because of the Department’s 
concerns about her office’s gun and immigration prosecution 
statistics.”65 At least in the gun and immigration areas—in which 
cases, at least by the time they get to federal prosecutors, are 
commodities fitting standard fact patterns66—the combined effect of 
the PROTECT Act, the Ashcroft Memorandum, and case counting 
from Washington was thus to inject a new degree of uniformity into 
the federal system. 
Less obvious but perhaps as important was the effect that the 
Bush administration’s fixation with case counting had in areas that 
were less amenable to such top-down regulation. When districts 
pursued gun, low-level drug, and immigration prosecutions, they 
dipped into a virtually inexhaustible supply of relatively easily made 
cases. Other kinds of cases, like corruption and white-collar fraud, 
take far more effort and result in far fewer convictions. A U.S. 
Attorney may pursue these cases for many reasons—personal 
ambition, public interest, recruiting, deep appreciation of the plight of 
unidentifiable victims. But on the margin, unnuanced case counting 
from above (unless balanced by other signals) cuts against activity in 
such resource-intensive areas, and likely did so here.67 Between 2003 
and 2007, the “percentage of white collar crime matters accepted for 
prosecution steadily declined,” decreasing from 50 percent of total 
 
 65. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, 
at 285. 
 66. See Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A 
Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239, 252–54 (2005) 
(describing how local police present gun cases to federal prosecutors); Nicole Gaouette, Federal 
Prosecution of Illegal Immigrants Soars, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2008, at A8 (discussing 
“Operation Streamline”). 
 67. See Avinash Dixit, Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative 
Review, 37 J. HUM. RESOURCES 696, 707, 711–17 (2002) (discussing this general institutional 
point); see also Bengt Holmstom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive 
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 26–28, 33 (1991) (“[I]f 
[an] agent increases the amount of time or attention devoted to one activity, the marginal cost 
of attention to . . . other activities will grow larger.”); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How 
to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009) 
(“[T]asks that are more easily measured are more likely to be performed at a higher level by an 
agent as compared to tasks that are harder to measure – at least where the principal’s incentives 
for the agent are based on those measurements.”). 
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matters referred to 28 percent.68 The percentage of public corruption 
matters filed for prosecution similarly fell during this period.69 
When it came to the federal death penalty, the department’s 
leadership was ready to go beyond the wholesale efforts of the 
Ashcroft Memorandum and attempt retail case management. With 
increasing regularity—and sometimes over protests that played a role 
in the firing of several U.S. Attorneys70—Attorneys General Ashcroft 
and Gonzales regularly overruled line recommendations against the 
death penalty.71 Here again the posture was one of strategic 
neutrality, with the articulated goal of horizontal equity in sentencing 
promoted through efforts to level up rather than down. 
To what extent did the Justice Department leadership, aided by 
Congress, actually succeed in promoting uniformity in the districts 
across cases? The answer is far from clear. There is “an essential 
incoherence in the notion of ‘uniformity’ when the universe of 
potential federal cases has never been prespecified.”72 Virtually every 
state drug case can be prosecuted federally. So can a great many 
robbery cases (under some sort of asset depletion theory).73 Just 
about every instance of fraud or corruption involves a mailing or wire 
communication that can give federal authorities jurisdiction, if they 
are so inclined.74 Yet for all the Bush Justice Department’s efforts to 
regulate federal sentences,75 it left investigators and prosecutors with 
largely untrammeled discretion about what cases went federal. 
 
 68. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 44–45. 
 69. Id. at 46–47. 
 70. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra 
note 22, at 227–45. 
 71. See John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General 
Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697, 
1697 (2003); Richman, supra note 38, at 1393. 
 72. Richman, supra note 22, at 1393 (making this point with respect to federal homicide 
cases). 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Torres, 435 F.3d 3, 9 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Depletion of 
the assets of a business engaged in interstate commerce is a common method for demonstrating 
that a robbery had an effect on interstate commerce.”). 
 74. See United States v. Turner, 551 F.3d 657, 666–68 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that even 
routine wire transfers can form the basis of a wire fraud conviction); United States v. Hebshie, 
549 F.3d 30, 37–40 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining the relationship that a mailing must have to a 
fraud for federal mail fraud to occur). 
 75. The department’s efforts to make prosecutors and sentences judges comply with the 
guidelines have largely fallen victim to developments in federal sentencing law since United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and, perhaps even more, Kimbrough v. United States, 128 
S. Ct. 558 (2007). See Richman, supra note 38, at 1376–78. 
RICHMAN IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:52:59 AM 
2102 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:2087 
Moreover, even if one overlooks this essential incoherence and 
considers uniformity among just those cases pursued federally, the 
evidence suggests that the Ashcroft Memorandum had only middling 
success in curbing “locally convenient plea bargaining practices.”76 
The important point (for our purpose), however, is how hard it tried 
and how willingly Congress—for all its historic interest in 
decentralized prosecutorial authority—abetted the process. 
In a 2005 paper, Professors Andrew Rudalevige and David Lewis 
hypothesize that centralization and politicization may be 
complementary strategies for an administration trying to maximize 
presidential power. Noting that an important cost of centralization is 
“that centralized formulation strategies tend to harm policy 
proposals’ chances of Congressional enactment,” they suggest, “[I]f a 
bureau is sufficiently politicized, the president can trust it to carry out 
his preferences without the additional costs of centralizing that 
process.”77 
Perhaps Professors Rudalevige and Lewis are right that 
presidents trade off centralization and politicization at the margin. 
When managing the Justice Department, however, the Bush 
administration evidently felt no pressure from Congress to operate at 
the margin and politicized the department even as it strove to 
centralize it. One facet of this process entailed the selection of a 
departmental leadership in Washington with proven track records of 
political service and without the prior experience in the department 
that would have exposed them to cross-cutting departmental norms. 
Past service as a line federal prosecutor in a previous 
administration—someone required to collaborate with agents and 
other prosecutors, argue before judges, and appear before juries in 
settings in which appeals to partisan preference would be radically 
out of place—is hardly a talismanic indicator of diminished allegiance 
to the White House. Neither is a political appointee’s lack of such 
prior experience a clear indicia of subservience. Consider Edward 
Levi, who, having been plucked from academia to serve as attorney 
general, soon “won wide acclaim for his stewardship of the Justice 
 
 76. Frank O. Bowman III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal 
Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 193. 
 77. Andrew Rudalevige & David E. Lewis, Parsing the Politicized Presidency: 
Centralization and Politicization as Presidential Strategies for Bureaucratic Control 8–9 (2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://princeton.academia.edu/DavidELewis/Papers/ 
26144/Parsing-the-Politicized-Presidency—Centralization—Politicization—and-Presidential-
Strategies-for-Bureaucratic-Control. 
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Department in the post-Watergate era.”78 But prior service as a line 
federal prosecutor—particularly when the service was under a 
different administration—is evidence of an appointee’s 
precommitment to a general federal enforcement project or, at the 
very least, to developing a reputation in the relatively small world of 
federal litigation. 
By the end of 2005—the first year of Bush’s second term—the 
attorney general was Alberto Gonzales (the president’s former 
lawyer and White House Counsel). The deputy attorney general was 
Paul McNulty, a long-term, Republican House Judiciary Committee 
staffer who had been dispatched in Bush’s first term to be U.S. 
Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia (a politically sensitive 
spot because, among other things, the office was prosecuting a 
flagship terrorist case against Zacharias Moussaoui).79 The assistant 
attorney general in charge of the Criminal Division was Alice Fisher, 
a protégé whom Michael Chertoff had brought to the Criminal 
Division from his law firm.80 In response to Fisher’s nomination, 
Senate Judiciary Committee members noted concerns that, “for the 
first time in memory, none of the most senior officials at the Justice 
Department . . . would have experience as a criminal prosecutor,” but 
they confirmed her anyway.81 
 
 78. Neil A. Lewis, Edward H. Levi, Attorney General Credited with Restoring Order After 
Watergate, Dies at 88, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at C25; see also Martin Weil, Edward Levi Dies 
at 88; U.S. Attorney General After Watergate, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2000, at B8 (recalling Levi as 
“the bow-tie-wearing legal scholar and university administrator who was credited with setting a 
standard for integrity and impartiality as U.S. attorney general in the years after Watergate”). 
 79. See Eric Lichtblau, White House Nears Choice on No. 2 Justice Position, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 21, 2005, at A18 (noting that McNulty had led the Bush transition at the Justice 
Department and, before that, had been “deeply involved in the impeachment proceedings 
against President Bill Clinton as chief counsel for the House Judiciary Committee”). 
 80. See Vanessa Blum, Latham & Watkins Partner to Head DOJ Criminal Division, LEGAL 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1112263511555 (“To many observers, 
the choice of a lawyer with no prosecutorial experience to run the Criminal Division is a 
surprising one.”). 
 81. Eric Lichtblau, Complaints Signal Tension Between F.B.I. and Congress, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 15, 2005, at A13. When Senate Judiciary Committee members noted this concern, Timothy 
Flanigan was the nominee for the deputy slot. Paul McNulty, who was named after Flanigan’s 
nomination ran aground, see Eric Lichtblau, President Picks 2nd Nominee for Justice Post, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2005, at A15, might be said to have prosecutorial experience because he was 
U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia. But he never had tried a case and had never 
served as anything other than a political appointee. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & 
OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, at 12; see also Jason McLure & Emma 
Schwartz, At DOJ, a Hard Job to Fill, LEGAL TIMES, May 21, 2007, at 1 (noting that McNulty 
“lacks any real trial experience”). 
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Second-term Bush administration efforts to ensure the political 
loyalty of its appointees—both positively (by selecting those with 
White House ties) and negatively (by avoiding appointees who had 
been exposed to line-prosecutor norms)—extended beyond the top 
slots in Washington, to the districts. In the wake of the U.S. Attorney 
firings and subsequent revelations about hiring practices, much has 
been made of the caliber of people surrounding Attorney General 
Gonzales and Deputy Attorney General McNulty.82 What many miss, 
however, is the unprecedented degree to which the Bush 
administration had packed the entire chain of command with 
appointees who had hitched their star to the fortunes of the White 
House. These included the leader of the Attorney General’s Advisory 
Council, the body within the department explicitly designed to “give[] 
United States Attorneys a voice in Department policies and advise[] 
the Attorney General of the United States.”83 In 2006, Gonzales 
named as its chairman Johnny Sutton, the U.S. Attorney for the 
Western District of Texas who had previously been then-Governor 
Bush’s criminal justice policy director in Texas.84 
The second Bush term also brought changes within the ranks of 
U.S. Attorneys—changes that reinforced the efforts in Washington to 
make the federal enforcement bureaucracy more responsive to signals 
from above. According to one report in April 2007, about “one-third 
of the nearly four dozen U.S. Attorneys’ jobs that have changed 
hands since [the beginning of Bush’s] second term have been filled by 
the White House and Justice Department with trusted administration 
 
William Mercer, the principal associate deputy attorney general from June 2005 to July 
2006, had been an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Montana. In October 2006, however, he was 
replaced with William Moschella, a longtime House staffer who had previously been the 
assistant attorney general in charge of legislative affairs. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & 
OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, at 13–14. 
 82. See John McKay, Train Wreck at the Justice Department: An Eyewitness Account, 31 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265, 276–77 (2008); Alan Cooperman, Bush Loyalist Rose Quickly at 
Justice, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2007, at A15; Eric Lipton, Fast-Riser’s High Hopes and Sudden 
Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at A15. 
 83. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 3-2.530 (1997); see 
also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 3 n.15 (“The AGAC, which is comprised 
of 16 U.S. Attorneys and 1 AUSA: (1) provides a mechanism for U.S. Attorneys to provide 
input on DOJ policies, and (2) advises the Attorney General on a variety of operational and 
programmatic issues affecting U.S. Attorneys.”). 
 84. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Gonzales Appoints Johnny 
Sutton and Susan Brooks to Lead Attorney General’s Advisory Committee of U.S. Attorneys 1 
(Mar. 28, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ins/press_releases/Pressrelease06/20060329.Brooks 
%20AGAC.pdf. 
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insiders.”85 The desire to align the districts with administration 
preference may not have been the only reason for these 
appointments. As Professor David Lewis has noted, “recent 
administrations have self-consciously promoted from within during 
their second terms partly as a way of building a farm team of both 
future elected office holders and future agency officials.”86 But 
deference to, even reliance on, local Republican legislators would 
have been consistent with the “farm team” approach, and that does 
not appear to have occurred. 
That the White House and the political leadership of the 
department would try to put insiders into U.S. Attorneys’ offices is 
not that surprising. To be sure, a policy of dispatching proconsuls to 
the provinces might have long-term costs in a system in which—to my 
mind at least—the U.S. Attorney’s main function is to mediate 
between national priorities and local needs and politics. In the short 
term, however, an administration might not be concerned about such 
costs. (Also, this was an administration for which long-term planning 
was not a strength.87) What is more surprising (given legislators’ 
traditional interest in some degree of district autonomy) is the extent 
to which Congress, and particularly Republican legislators, 
acquiesced in the selection of U.S. Attorneys whose ties were far 
closer to Washington than to the districts.88 
The extent to which the Republican Congress would acquiesce in 
a new level of executive control over the districts was highlighted by 
the nondebate over the introduction into the 2006 USA PATRIOT 
Act reauthorization legislation of a provision changing the procedures 
for the appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys.89 When a U.S. 
 
 85. Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Prosecutor Posts Go to Bush Insiders; Less Preference 
Shown for Locals, Senators’ Choices, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2007, at A1. 
 86. LEWIS, supra note 36, at 196. 
 87. See, e.g., THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ 
3 (2006) (suggesting that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was “launched recklessly, with a flawed plan 
for war and a worse approach to occupation”). See generally DEXTER FILKINS, THE FOREVER 
WAR (2008) (recounting difficulties American troops have faced in Afghanistan and Iraq). 
 88. See Philip Shenon, Amid Turmoil, U.S. Attorney Will Shift to Headquarters, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at A14 (noting how, under Attorney General Gonzales, “experienced 
prosecutors were succeeded by relatively young and inexperienced lawyers seen as fiercely loyal 
to the administration”). 
 89. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 
502, 120 Stat. 192, 246 (2006) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 546 (2000)). The provision has since been 
amended via the Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-34, 
§ 2, 121 Stat. 224, 224 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 546). 
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Attorney vacancy occurred under the old system, the attorney general 
named someone, but if the Senate had not confirmed that person 
within 120 days, the district court could appoint someone else.90 The 
new legislation “repeal[ed] the authority of the court and permit[ted] 
the Attorney General’s temporary designee to serve until the vacancy 
[had been] filled by confirmation and appointment.”91 The change 
thus gave the White House and the department’s political leaders 
confidence that, were they to fire (or otherwise lose) a U.S. Attorney, 
they could fill the vacancy indefinitely with their own person without 
facing a pressing need either to satisfy the local district court or even 
gain Senate confirmation.92 
The provision passed with nary a peep from Congress.93 The 
Justice Department’s congressional liaison arranged for a staffer on 
Chairman Arlen Specter’s Senate Judiciary Committee, Brett 
Tolman, to slip the provision into the bill. And the White House 
thereafter appointed Tolman U.S. Attorney for the District of Utah.94 
Notwithstanding this collective congressional apathy toward 
protecting its institutional interests, the subsequent U.S. Attorney 
firings—unprecedented in the absence of any change in presidential 
administration95—are hardly evidence that individual legislators had 
abandoned the field when it came to protecting or advancing their 
own interests.96 Indeed, the narratives behind some of the firings, 
 
 90. BRIAN T. YEH & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., USA PATRIOT 
IMPROVEMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005, A LEGAL ANALYSIS 49 (2006), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf. 
 91. Id. 
 92. In a September 2006 email, Kyle Sampson explained the benefit of the new interim 
appointment procedure: “By not going the PAS [Senate confirmation] route, we can give far 
less deference to home-State Senators and thereby get (1) our preferred person appointed and 
(2) do it far faster and more efficiently, at less political cost to the White House.” OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, at 36; see also id. at 
145–47 (describing how Sampson and other Justice Department staffers considered using the 
interim appointment authority to bypass the Senate confirmation process). 
 93. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-58, at 5 (2007) (noting that the interim appointment provision 
“was inserted quietly into the conference report on the 2005 Act, without debate”). 
 94. Richman, supra note 38, at 1391; see also Dahlia Lithwick, Specter Detector: U.S. 
Attorney Scandal Update: Who’s to Blame for Those Alarming Patriot Act Revisions, SLATE, 
Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2161260/pagenum/all (“[T]he requested change had come 
from the Department of Justice . . . it had been handled by Brett Tolman, who is now the U.S. 
attorney for Utah.”). 
 95. See KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE 
SERVED LESS THAN FULL FOUR-YEAR TERMS, 1981–2006, at 5–7 (2007). 
 96. When the replacement of 15 to 20 percent of U.S. Attorneys—the “underperforming” 
ones—was being contemplated in January 2005, Kyle Sampson (who had just moved from the 
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particularly those of Carol Lam in San Diego and David Iglesias in 
New Mexico, clearly include exertions of influence by local 
legislators.97 The recent OIG/OPR Report found that the U.S. 
Attorney in Missouri (the brother of a member of Congress) was 
forced out as a result of complaints to the White House by the staff of 
Senator Christopher Bond.98 Conversely, even some U.S. Attorneys 
deemed “mediocre” were taken off the removal list because one of 
the lists’ masterminds, Gonzales’s chief of staff Kyle Sampson (and 
perhaps others), thought the home senators of those officials would 
complain.99 As an institution, however, Congress was remarkably 
complacent. And regardless of the personal and political calculus of 
the legislators who resorted to Washington for relief, their 
interventions certainly had nothing to with advancing Congress’s 
institutional interest in insulating U.S. Attorneys’ offices from 
presidential control.100 
III.  CONGRESS WAKES UP 
Given Congress’s long-term institutional interests and strategies, 
the furor that the U.S. Attorney firings unleashed in 2007 was thus 
overdetermined. Indeed, the interesting part is not the reaction of a 
newly elected Democratic Congress to the Bush administration’s 
centralization efforts but the prior acquiescence of Republican 
legislators. That said, the attorney general did not step down until 
 
White House to the Justice Department and would soon be Gonzales’s chief of staff) “predicted 
that ‘as a political matter . . . I suspect that when push comes to shove, home-State Senators 
likely would resist wholesale (or even piecemeal) replacement of U.S. Attorneys they 
recommended . . . if Karl [Rove] thinks there would be political will to do it, then so do I.’” 
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, at 17 
(alterations in original). 
 97. See id. at 190–94 (discussing the firing of Iglesias); id. at 277–83 (recounting legislative 
complaints about the level of immigration enforcement in Carol Lam’s district). 
 98. See id. at 113 (“The fact that the impetus for Graves’s removal appears to have 
stemmed from his decision not to intervene in a personnel dispute between Senator Bond’s staff 
and staff in Representative Sam Graves’s office is a disturbing commentary on the Department 
of Justice’s support for U.S. Attorneys.”); see also R. Jeffrey Smith, How Political Warfare in 
Missouri Led to Prosecutor’s Firing, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2008, at A2 (describing how a little 
over a year after U.S. Attorney Todd P. Graves refused to intervene on Sen. Christopher S. 
Bond’s behalf, Graves “was bounced from his Kansas City office after Bond’s staff made 
repeated complaints to the White House counsel’s office”). 
 99. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, 
at 330. 
 100. See LEWIS, supra note 35, at 28–29 (discussing congressional calculus with respect to 
insulating agencies from presidential control). 
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after former Deputy Attorney General James Comey told his 
unnerving story of Gonzales’s effort in March 2004 to extract 
permission from a grievously ill Ashcroft for an NSA surveillance 
program.101 Perhaps the extraordinary length of time Gonzales 
seemed to twist in the wind was just a reflection of his close 
relationship with the president,102 but maybe it also reflected the 
difficulty legislators and others had in explaining how the haphazard 
termination of appointees who “served at the pleasure of the 
president”103 really did amount to an unprecedented exercise of 
executive power and threat to the U.S. Attorney system. 
Yet even as members of the new Congress excoriated the 
political leadership of the Justice Department for disrespecting the 
U.S. Attorney system,104 many of them simultaneously pursued 
another, very different project—one quite at odds with their embrace 
of local autonomy during the hearings that the U.S. Attorney firings 
sparked. In this far quieter, more technical-sounding campaign, they 
eschewed the virtues of decentralized enforcement decisionmaking 
and were not even satisfied with close central monitoring, but rather 
sought to radically limit enforcement discretion by statute.105 That 
legislators would pursue such a campaign against the backdrop of the 
public celebration of U.S Attorney autonomy might sound odd. That 
they did so in an enforcement area—corporate crime—marked 
 
 101. See David Stout, Gonzales Pressed Ailing Ashcroft on Spy Plan, Aide Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/washington/15cnd-attorneys.html?_r=2&hp& 
oref=slogin. For a fuller narrative of this incident, see Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is 
the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearings Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 213–40 (2007) (testimony of James B. Comey, 
former Deputy Att’y Gen., United States Department of Justice); BARTON GELLMAN, 
ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 302–05 (2008). 
 102. See Emily Bazelon, John Dickerson & Dahlia Lithwick, Deathwatch: Gonzo-Meter: Is 
Alberto Gonzales Going Down?, SLATE, Mar. 20, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2162289 
(tracking Gonzales’s status during the months in which many called for his resignation); Steven 
Lee Myers & Philip Shenon, Embattled Attorney General Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/27/washington/27cnd-gonzales.html (noting that Gonzales “had 
rebuffed calls for his resignation for months”). 
 103. Press Release, President Bush Addresses Resignations of U.S. Attorneys (Mar. 20, 
2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/print/20070320-8.html (noting that U.S. 
Attorneys “serve at the pleasure of the President”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 541 (2006) (declaring 
that a U.S. Attorney is “subject to removal by the President”). 
 104. See, e.g., Preserving Prosecutorial Independence, supra note 101, at 495 (testimony of J. 
Scott Jennings, Special Assistant to the President); United States Department of Justice: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 33–38 (2007) (statement of Sen. John 
Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 105. For a discussion of the Feeney Amendment, see supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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throughout this post-Enron period by bursts of fierce rhetoric and 
substantive legislation hiking sentences and creating new offenses106 
sounds even more curious. Yet for those used to seeing Congress 
deploy procedural restraints that undercut the ostensible sweep of 
substantive criminal statutes,107 the action in this area has been less 
surprising—just a return to the old legislative dynamic. The only 
remarkable part has been the breadth of the legislative alliance 
favoring (at least until the current financial meltdown) this restraining 
effort. 
A brief doctrinal detour is necessary. Indeed, the challenges of 
explaining substantive and procedural doctrine in this area has long 
made it particularly amenable to low visibility interest group activity, 
and an impressionistic sketch must suffice.108 Corporate criminal 
liability, based essentially on respondeat superior, is mostly a matter 
of federal common law and is spectacularly expansive.109 Investigating 
corporate crime is resource intensive, however, in part because 
targets, witnesses, and innocent bystanders generally seek (and can 
afford) counsel as soon as they become aware of the government’s 
interest.110 And enforcement resources are often scarce, particularly in 
recent years, with competition from other priorities like 
 
 106. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman III, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and 
Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing 
Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 375 (2004) (“[T]he 
Sarbanes-Oxley saga began with a frenzied determination by some legislators to shoot a few of 
the erring admirals of American business in response to the eruption of corporate scandals in 
2002, and culminated in a 2003 round of sentencing guideline amendments that extended the 
original punitive impulse to virtually everyone convicted in federal court of some form of 
stealing . . . .”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement 68 
n.137 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 304, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=967482 (“The political preference of U.S. voters for strong enforcement 
and punitive punishments is shown not just by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which vastly elevated 
penalty levels, but by earlier legislation as well.”). 
 107. See Richman, supra note 25, at 800–02. 
 108. See Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 295 passim (2008) (providing a more elaborate 
discussion of these issues); see also Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees 
Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 
passim (2007). 
 109. See Bharara, supra note 108, at 61–65 (tracing the history of corporate criminal 
liability); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry 
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 444 (1981); V.S. Khanna, 
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1482 
(1996). 
 110. See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF 
ATTORNEYS AT WORK 21 (1985). 
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counterterrorism and violent crime. Perhaps of even more concern to 
thoughtful prosecutors are the collateral consequences that a criminal 
conviction would have on shareholders, employees, and diverse third 
parties.111 
For their part, corporate entities have responded to the breadth 
of firm liability and the drumbeat of criminal and regulatory 
enforcement activity (even though the number of actual enforcement 
actions or prosecutions has been relatively small) by commissioning 
internal investigations whenever there is a whiff of misconduct.112 
When there is any issue of criminal liability, these investigations allow 
corporate counsel the means to appease the government by offering 
up malefactors if necessary, or at least to have a better sense of 
potential firm liability when they deal with prosecutors—as they 
almost invariably will during the early stages of an investigation. 
Although the employees and executives questioned during the 
internal investigation are under severe economic pressure to 
cooperate with corporate counsel—because they may lose their jobs if 
they do not—the only attorney-client privilege protecting their 
communications is owned by the firm, which always has the option of 
waiving the privilege to advance its interests during discussions with 
regulators or prosecutors.113 
Early in the Bush administration, Deputy Attorney General 
Larry Thompson issued a directive—largely echoing policy guidance 
issued during the Clinton administration—that seemed (to many) to 
require that a firm seeking to avoid prosecution by cooperating with 
the government waive its attorney-client privilege.114 Prosecutors were 
 
 111. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 
1387 (2002). 
 112. See Michael N. Levy, Michael L. Spafford & Lothlórien S. Redmond, The Changing 
Nature of Internal Probes, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Jan./Feb. 2007, at 51, 51 (“When even seemingly 
routine allegations of wrongdoing arise, corporations almost inevitably launch internal 
investigations. The proliferation of such investigations is a direct result of today’s more stringent 
regulatory environment.”). 
 113. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal 
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 326–37 (2007); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 
383, 396–97 (1981) (setting out the contours of corporate attorney-client privilege); In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that the formation of an 
attorney-client privilege with employees of a publicly traded corporation would preclude full 
investigation and candid reporting to management). 
 114. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys 6 (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
dag/cftf/business_organizations.pdf; see also Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate 
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particularly prone to seek these waivers as political leaders in 
Washington called for corporate scalps; free riding off the 
investigative efforts of corporate counsel seemed both sensible and 
easy. For their part, firms recognized that turning over their 
investigative haul to the government would probably limit how long 
they would be under scrutiny. But they doubtless preferred to make 
that choice on their own, without explicit (or even implicit) 
government pressure. And, swelled by the voices of white-collar 
counsel who represented either corporations or individual clients who 
could only lose from corporate-privilege waivers, the Chamber of 
Commerce and other business groups began to complain loudly of 
this “erosion” of the attorney-client privilege.115 
Until the end of 2006, the department’s political leaders made 
little effort to rein in waiver demands (explicit or tacit) in the districts. 
Indeed, the department’s continued embrace of decentralized 
prosecutorial decisionmaking in the white-collar area116 during this 
period contrasts starkly with the department’s contemporaneous 
efforts, through Sentencing Guidelines policy, to curtail the districts’ 
bargaining discretion. An October 2005 directive issued in the face of 
widespread criticism from the white-collar bar simply enjoined each 
U.S. Attorney to retain and exercise discretion over line assistants.117 
The department began to run into a legislative headwind, 
however. And by December 2006, it had to shift course in the face of 
pressure from Senator Specter (and perhaps others).118 A directive by 
Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty—which he first announced 
on December 12 in a speech to a New York–based business and 
 
Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1096–97 (2006). 
 115. See, e.g., William R. McLucas, Howard M. Shapiro & Julie J. Song, The Decline of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 629 
(2006); David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakauer, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death 
of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 147–48 (2000). 
 116. To defend its waiver policy in 2003, the department deployed someone from the field: 
James Comey—then the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. Interview with 
United States Attorney James B. Comey Regarding Department of Justice’s Policy on Requesting 
Corporations Under Criminal Investigation to Waive the Attorney Client Privilege and Work 
Product Protection, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 
2003, at 1, 1–2, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5106.pdf. 
 117. Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys 1 (Oct. 21, 2005), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/files/AttorneyClientWaiverMemo.pdf. 
 118. See Sarah Johnson, Senator Takes on DoJ’s Thompson Memo, CFO.COM, Sept. 14, 
2006, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7929239?f=related. 
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defense lawyer group—imposed a new degree of centralized 
supervision of prosecutorial waiver demands.119 The McNulty 
Memorandum required prosecutors, before asking for the most 
frequently sought privileged materials (primarily factual in nature), to 
obtain written authorization from the U.S. Attorney, who in turn was 
supposed to consult with Washington in each case. Before seeking 
privilege waivers for legal advice materials, prosecutors had to get 
explicit permission from the deputy attorney general personally.120 
The McNulty Memorandum was not strong enough for Senator 
Specter, who did not even wait for its announcement to introduce the 
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, which, among other 
things, barred the government from demanding the waiver of an 
organizational attorney-client privilege. The Act also barred 
prosecutors from considering an entity’s assertion of that privilege 
when deciding whether to pursue criminal (or civil) charges.121 
Although no longer Senate Judiciary Committee chair (in the wake of 
the 2006 midterm elections), Senator Specter reintroduced the bill as 
soon as the new Congress convened in 2007.122 
Underneath backers’ broad rhetoric about the sanctity of 
privilege and the sweeping extension of the bill’s protections to all 
potential defendants lay the ugly fact that the legislation exclusively 
benefitted firms (and other such organizations), as well as the 
(generally) white-collar employees who would be implicated by 
corporate cooperation. After all, even in a criminal justice world in 
which waiving all sorts of rights is (for better or worse) the norm, 
prosecutors just about never seek attorney-client privilege waivers 
from individual defendants and are unlikely to ever do so.123 Perhaps 
this fact was not widely recognized. It certainly did not stop the 
 
 119. See Richman, supra note 108, at 301. 
 120. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys 9 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. 
 121. Attorney-Client Privilege Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong. § 3(b) (as referred to the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 8, 2006). 
 122. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (as referred to 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 4, 2007). Senator Spector introduced the bill again in 2008. See 
Attorney-Client Privilege Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong. (as referred to the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, June 26, 2008). 
 123. See Richman, supra note 108, at 311–12 (suggesting reasons why the government 
refrains from seeking privilege waivers from individual cooperators). 
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American Civil Liberties Union from backing the bill124 and joining a 
coalition that, by July 2008, included the Business Roundtable, the 
National Association of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce.125 With this broad backing, the bill gained support from 
both antiregulation legislators and those who saw (or purported to 
see) it as a civil liberties issue. In July 2007, “Bobby” Scott, a 
Democrat of Virginia—with a host of bipartisan cosponsors including 
John Conyers, the new chair of the House Judiciary Committee—
introduced similar legislation in the House126 that soon passed by a 
large margin. 
The spring of 2008 brought another push by Senator Specter and 
his allies and another effort by the department to mollify them.127 
Among the cosponsors of the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection 
Act of 2008 were Senators Biden, Dole, Graham, Kerry, and 
Feinstein.128 As of February 2009, however, the front is quiet, even 
though Senator Spector just reintroduced his bill.129 I suspect that 
moves to deprive the government of critical enforcement powers in 
 
 124. The ACLU opined that the legislation was “necessary in order to protect against 
overzealous government investigations that have violated the constitutional rights guaranteed to 
all Americans.” Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Supports Legislation Aimed 
at Protecting Attorney-Client Privilege (July 12, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/gen/ 
30559prs20070712.html. 
 125. Press Release, The Coalition to Preserve Att’y-Client Privilege, Coalition Praises 
Introduction of New Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act (June 26, 2008), 
http://www.nam.org/~/media/Files/s_nam/docs/240800/240702.pdf.ashx. 
 126. Press Release, Congressman Robert “Bobby” C. Scott, Rep. Scott Introduces the 
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007 (July 13, 2007), http://www.house.gov/list/ 
press/va03_scott/pr_070713a.html. 
 127. See Letter from Mark Filip, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen., to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary & Arlen Spector, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary 2 (July 9, 2008), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/ 
FilipLetter070908.pdf; see also Carrie Johnson, Corporate Crime Probes to Get New Guidelines, 
WASH. POST, July 10, 2008, at D3 (describing the prosecutorial guidelines promulgated in the 
Filip memo); Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, The Filip Memorandum: Does It Go Far 
Enough?, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 2008, at 4 (commenting on the Filip Memo). For the DOJ 
guidelines promulgated in September 2008, see generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 83, 
at tit. IX. 
 128. Attorney-Client Privilege Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong. (as referred to the Comm. 
on the Judiciary, June 26, 2008). 
 129. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, S. 445, 111th Cong. (as referred to 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 13, 2009) (introduced by Senator Specter, with co-sponsoring 
Senators Landrieu, Carper, Kerry, McCaskill, and Cochran). 
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the white-collar area have gone radically out of fashion and will not 
return for at least a little while.130 
Even as legislators considered restraining federal prosecutors in 
corporate crime enforcement, they took pains to ensure that the 
Justice Department committed additional resources to intellectual 
property criminal enforcement. Congress has created a broad range 
of criminal intellectual property offenses in recent years and has 
vociferously demanded that federal prosecutors pursue cases in the 
area.131 In 2007, spurred, perhaps, by industry complaints, legislators 
started to push hard for more enforcement zeal and, true to (pre–
Bush administration) form, they looked to institutional design. 
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report—
commissioned by a ranking Republican member of Congress—soon 
identified one source of the problem. Intellectual property (IP) 
enforcement, it found, “is not a top priority”132 for most of the “key 
federal agencies with IP enforcement roles.”133 It noted, “We were not 
able to identify the total resources allocated to IP enforcement across 
the agencies because few staff are dedicated solely to IP enforcement, 
and only certain agencies track the time spent on IP criminal 
investigations by non-dedicated staff who carry out this function.”134 
The GAO went on to chide agencies for failing to “take key steps to 
assess IP enforcement achievements.”135 Agencies simply looked at 
outputs (that is, cases brought) without “performance measures 
related to these statistics.”136 
 
 130. See Grant McCool, Lifting the Lid—Wall Street Probes Target Complex Securities, 
REUTERS, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssConsumerFinancialServices/idUSN0 
851166420081008 (“U.S. authorities have started a new slate of probes spurred by the financial 
industry meltdown, investigations that come as politicians and the public are calling for heads to 
roll on Wall Street.”). On February 11, 2009, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing 
entitled The Need for Increased Fraud Enforcement in the Wake of the Economic Downturn: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Carrie Johnson, 
Justice Department Putting New Focus on Combating Corporate Fraud, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 
2009, at A6. 
 131. See Richman, supra note 25, at 792 (noting that this is the rare area in which Congress 
has, by statute, required tallies of cases in the Attorney General’s Annual Report). 
 132. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FEDERAL 
ENFORCEMENT HAS GENERALLY INCREASED, BUT ASSESSING PERFORMANCE COULD 
STRENGTHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 3 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d08157.pdf. 
 133. Id. at 9. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 32. 
 136. Id. at 35. 
RICHMAN IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:52:59 AM 
2009] FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS 2115 
Congress moved into action with the Prioritizing Resources and 
Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2007.137 Over Justice 
Department objections, legislators sought—among other measures to 
increase IP enforcement—to create a new Intellectual Property 
Division within the department, with a chief reporting directly to the 
deputy attorney general, and a White House office with exclusive 
cross-agency powers.138 IP enforcement units in U.S. Attorneys’ 
offices were to be beefed up, and all U.S. Attorneys would be 
required to review their “standards for accepting or declining 
prosecution of criminal IP cases.”139 The administration was able to 
hold some ground. When the bill ultimately passed, in October 2008, 
it specified that the new “Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Coordinator” in the White House would not “control or direct any 
law enforcement agency, including the Department of Justice, in the 
exercise of its investigative or prosecutorial authority.”140 Nor would 
there be any new Intellectual Property Division. Congress did, 
however, take pains in the final bill to hold the department’s feet to 
the fire, demanding annual reports from the attorney general and the 
FBI director on what had been done with the new resources that the 
final legislation committed to IP enforcement. 
There is no grand theme that ties these legislative forays 
together. The last two years of the Bush administration simply saw 
Congress returning to its “normal” interaction with the executive in 
the federal criminal enforcement area: as before, there would be 
broad substantive law legislation that severely punished whatever 
conduct the legislature deemed worthy of condemnation.141 As before, 
 
 137. H.R. 4279, 110th Cong. (2008); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-617, at 21 n.3 (2008) (noting 
the findings of the GAO report). 
 138. For the Justice Department’s reaction, see Prioritizing Resources and Organization for 
Intellectual Property Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 4279 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 38–53 (2007) 
(statement of Sigal Mandelker, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Mandelker071213.pdf; Frank Ahrens, House Bill to 
Create Anti-Piracy Czar Advances, WASH. POST, May 1, 2008, at D1. 
 139. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-617, at 44 (explaining section 513, the “Transparency of 
Prosecutorial Decision-Making” provision of the House bill). 
 140. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-403, § 301(b)(2), 122 Stat. 4256, 4265 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8101). 
 141. See Providing Resources, Officers, and Technology to Eradicate Cyber Threats to Our 
Children Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-401, 122 Stat. 4229 (to be codified in scattered sections of 
18, 42 U.S.C.); Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, tit. I, 
122 Stat. 4001, 4001–03 (2008) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C § 2251); Animal Fighting Prohibition 
Enforcement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-22, 121 Stat. 88 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1). 
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too, Congress would—when legislators thought it served their (or the 
“public’s”) interest—pay attention to the design of the enforcement 
bureaucracy, to how power would be allocated within it, and even to 
what otherwise would be matters for negotiated dispositions. 
Legislators would be committed to decentralized enforcement 
authority and would celebrate the independence of U.S. Attorneys’ 
offices—except when a policy preference trumped this generalized 
institutional interest. 
The issue thus becomes whether we can do better than 
“normal”? 
IV.  GOING FORWARD 
The Bush administration did have one thing right: the last eight 
years should have been a time of fundamental change in the Justice 
Department. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the FBI had to 
shift resources to intelligence functions, and to conduct even its 
criminal enforcement activities with counterterrorism goals in mind.142 
The need for these shifts, coupled with a significant decline in violent 
crime rates nationwide, presented a golden opportunity to reconsider 
the extent to which federal agents and prosecutors should be pursuing 
crimes falling within the normal remit of state and local enforcers.143 
Immigration policy questions also had to be faced: What level of 
immigration law enforcement would there be, and how much would 
be pursued through criminal charges? And what about white-collar 
enforcement? Even given the regrettable tendency of our political 
leaders to think seriously about corporate crime only after a large-
scale debacle,144 the collapse of Enron should have counted as such a 
policy moment. And the question of how offenses would be 
prosecuted should have loomed as large as that of whether new 
white-collar offenses should be created. 
 
 142. See Richman, supra note 17, at 408–09. 
 143. Id. at 416. 
 144. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2530 (2005) (noting that 
Congress intervenes in corporate law primarily when “constituents scream, fire alarms go off, 
and the media spots a big issue”); see also Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal 
Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1833 (2006) (“[S]ome federal 
interventions—most importantly, those that require Congress to act—often take place in 
response to a financial or other crisis providing lawmakers with compelling reasons to respond 
to the public outcry and restore confidence.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. 
REV. 77, 79–83 (2003) (describing corporate-crime prosecution as following a “boom-bubble-
bust-regulate cycle”). 
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These challenges remain. Here are some tentative thoughts on 
how the Obama administration and Congress should confront a 
system beset by shifting and underarticulated national priorities and 
primarily comprised of field institutions that have only recently 
started to recover from haphazard centralization efforts. 
The Obama administration should give due attention to making 
U.S. Attorneys’ offices bastions of professionalism.145 This entails, 
among other things, considering competence as well as loyalty when 
appointing U.S. Attorneys and placing severe limitations on 
telephone calls from legislators and the White House about specific 
cases.146 Yet even as Congress supports what will amount to a 
devolution of the centralized power sought by the Bush Justice 
Department, it should still collaborate with Attorney General Eric 
Holder and the Obama administration to set and promote an 
enforcement agenda. Indeed, Congress’s decisions about the 
allocation of authority within the Justice Department and on the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion will likely have more impact on 
who gets prosecuted and for what than its substantive lawmaking; 
there are diminishing marginal returns in devising yet another way to 
say that already criminalized conduct violates yet another statute or 
should be punished by thirty years in prison rather than twenty. If, for 
example, legislators are now serious about pursuing corporate 
crime,147 they not only should allow the Attorney Client Protection 
Act to die in committee but should also embrace U.S. Attorneys’ 
offices as engines of zeal in these cases, much as Attorney General 
Mukasey did when he refused to create a special task force to 
investigate alleged misconduct relating to the financial crisis that 
began in 2008.148 
 
 145. See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 53–60, on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(discussing potential controls that might minimize improper partisan motivations in U.S. 
Attorneys’ offices). 
 146. Immediately upon taking office, Attorney General Mukasey made significant moves in 
this direction. See Dan Eggen, Mukasey Limits Agency’s Contacts with White House, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 20, 2007, at A3. 
 147. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, S. 386, 111th Cong. (introduced 
Feb. 5, 2009) (proposing additional funding and personnel dedicated to prosecuting financial 
crimes); Zachary A. Goldfarb, Senators Call for Fraud Probes; Schumer, Shelby Propose More 
Spending on Investigations, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2009, at D2; Paul Shukovsky, Senators Push 
for More FBI Funding; $75 Million Sought to Reverse Bush-Era “Lack of Balance,” SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 2, 2009, at A1. 
 148. See Eric Lichtblau, Mukasey Declines to Create a U.S. Task Force to Investigate 
Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at A1; see also Robert Schmidt, FBI Halts Some 
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Even those most committed to putting the carefree days of 
deregulation behind us, however, ought to recognize that simply 
licensing U.S. Attorneys’ offices to go forth and smite corporate 
malefactors is yet another path to economic chaos. The general 
jurisdiction that allows U.S. Attorneys’ offices to develop 
reputational capital across a broad range of cases and train future 
securities fraud assistants with drug and gun cases comes with its own 
institutional-competence limitations. The risk that a hard-charging 
prosecutor’s righteous indignation will have serious collateral 
consequences in the marketplace is all too real.149 The goal, therefore, 
is to balance the contributions that U.S. Attorneys’ offices can make 
as insulated islands of professional commitment, local knowledge, and 
dedicated human capital with the contributions that they can make as 
the leading edge of a broader regulatory effort. To tightly tether 
federal prosecutors to the decisionmaking of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (or the Environmental Protection Agency’s) 
enforcement division deprives the system of the benefits of 
overlapping jurisdiction and reduces the system’s resilience (to 
capture or other dampening influences) to that of its weakest 
member.150 But a substantial disjunction between regulatory agencies 
and criminal prosecutors sends inefficiently noisy signals about 
government policy to regulatory subjects and creates confusing, 
sometimes even bad, law.151 
 
Cases to Investigate Mortgage Frauds, BLOOMBERG.COM, June 13, 2008, http://www.bloomberg. 
com/apps/news?pid=20601109&refer=patrick.net&sid=abmYcBtoJT1Q (reporting that 
“confronting a surge in mortgage fraud,” the FBI “has ordered more than two dozen of its field 
offices to stop probing some financial crimes so agents can focus on the subprime crisis”). 
 149. See Brown, supra note 111, at 1412–13; Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform 
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 879 (2007). 
 150. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Institutional Logic of Preventative Crime 25 
(Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 1272235, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1272235 (“Unlike other agencies, the bureaucracies charged with crime prevention are likely to 
enjoy a greater degree of political insulation and influence owing to the perceived sensitivity of 
their law enforcement mission and their ability to strategically leverage responsibilities widely 
perceived as involving high social value.”). 
 151. Emil J. Bove III, Institutional Factors Bearing on Criminal Charging Decisions in 
Complex Regulatory Environments, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1347, 1381 (2008) (noting that 
prosecutors’ “lack of experience with the structure and norms of the [regulatory] environment 
may lead to mixed signals and conflicting interpretations”); see also, e.g., Margaret V. Sachs, 
Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1043–44 (suggesting that some 
criminal uses of securities statutes in the 1980s broke new legal ground); Gerard E. Lynch, The 
Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 54 
(Summer 1997) (“The EPA or SEC lawyer may be better able to compare each case with other 
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Structures like the Corporate Fraud Task Force offer the best 
vehicle for navigating between these two extremes. That particular 
task force may have been intended as a branding device and did not 
amount to much more than that during the Bush administration. Yet 
its basic conception—neither an additional bureaucratic overlay on 
U.S. Attorneys’ efforts nor a complete embrace of decentralization—
offers a helpful framework for coordinating across enforcement 
agencies and between Washington and the districts. Such entities 
offer a forum in which prosecutors join regulators to figure out the 
role that criminal prosecutions can play within an integrated 
regulatory program.152 Moreover, given that corporate targets 
frequently come to Washington anyway, trying to avert indictment or 
intense prosecutorial attention with complaints of district 
overreaching, close coordination between Washington and the 
districts would prevent cycling between extreme decentralization and 
central intervention. 
The Obama administration and Congress also have to decide 
how much of the federal criminal docket should be devoted to 
immigration cases. This decision will be driven by considerations of 
immigration policy, which must be reinstated on the political agenda. 
Yet policymakers independently need to recognize the distorting 
effects that the prioritization of easily made and counted prosecutions 
like those involving illegal reentry (as well as gun and pornography 
 
violations of securities or environmental laws, in terms of its importance to operating honest 
capital markets or protecting environmental quality, but the prosecutor is better equipped to 
compare the violation with other types of crime in terms of the moral blameworthiness of 
conduct, the degree of departure from general standards of citizenship, and the equity of 
imposing stigmatizing punishment.”). 
 152. Such integration can be hard even within a regulatory agency. A report on the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training 
(OCEFT), prepared during the Bush administration, noted that the unit’s “immediate 
challenge . . . is how to target available resources so that environmental crimes cases are 
productive from a prosecutorial standpoint, promote justice, and reduce pollution. This will 
involve more integration with civil enforcement and even regulatory development than OCEFT 
has historically done, to produce better outcomes than each individual program can do alone.” 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT, 
FORENSICS AND TRAINING 55 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/ 
publications/criminal/oceft-review03.pdf. In the wake of this report and changes it provoked, 
congressional investigators found that centralized control within the Environmental Protection 
Agency had “slowed agents’ ability to make referrals.” See John Solomon & Juliet Eilperin, 
Bush’s EPA Is Pursuing Fewer Polluters; Probes and Prosecutions Have Declined Sharply, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2007, at A1. 
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possession) have on the rest of a district’s workload.153 The story of 
Nevada U.S. Attorney Dan Bogden, who told the crusading former 
Utah U.S. Attorney in charge of the department’s pornography task 
force that competing priorities (like counterterrorism) precluded him 
from adding to the task force’s tally by bringing an adult obscenity 
prosecution in Las Vegas, and was probably fired for his temerity, 
drives the point home.154 
That the whole notion of opportunity cost seems foreign to 
legislators is particularly odd given the challenges of figuring out 
enforcement levels in any prespecified area. The GAO complaint155 
that federal enforcers simply touted the numbers of intellectual 
property cases they brought, without performance measures 
capturing either the precise problem that the enforcers were seeking 
to address or the extent they were addressing it, is pretty much true 
across the entire range of federal criminal enforcement. And 
Congress has not seemed to mind. Let us hope that the Obama 
administration works with Congress to set priorities that will be 
backed by clear commitments of resources and that will have 
identifiable effects on areas not so prioritized—not the fake priorities 
the department often cites without specifying resource commitments 
or admitting any opportunity costs.156 Unless the size of the federal 
criminal footprint is radically increased, performance measures will 
indeed be hard to devise for a great many areas of potential criminal 
 
 153. See Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Prosecutors Hit New High, WASH. POST, June 2, 2008, 
at A1 (noting warnings of unnamed “federal officials” that “the focus on immigration is 
distorting the functions of law enforcement and the courts” but also reporting the Justice 
Department claim that “the government has not seen decreases in all other types of 
prosecutions and is increasing resources to support five border-area U.S. attorney’s offices”). 
 154. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, 
at 205–17. 
 155. See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text. 
 156. In May 2005, the head of the Criminal Division announced the establishment of an 
“Obscenity Prosecution Task Force dedicated exclusively to the investigation and prosecution 
of obscenity cases.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Obscenity Prosecution Task Force 
Established to Investigate, Prosecute Purveyors of Obscene Materials (May 5, 2005), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/May/05_crm_242.htm. By 2008, department watchdogs 
reported that the “task force” had consisted of “approximately two to four attorneys” and that, 
in internal communications, the director had “vociferously complained that obscenity 
prosecutions were not, in fact, a Department priority.” OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & 
OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, at 205; see also Joe Mozingo, Obscenity 
Task Force’s Aim Disputed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at B1 (”Many federal prosecutors . . . feel 
obscenity cases are not worth the time and resources they take away from their main missions, 
such as stemming terrorism and organized crime.”). 
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enforcement activity.157 Still, Congress, working with the GAO, 
should make more of any effort or should at least try to squeeze some 
useful metrics out of the department that go beyond case or scalp 
counting.158 
Any call for serious and more explicit national political 
deliberation about federal enforcement priorities must reckon with 
the unique ability of federal enforcers to directly influence the 
political process by putting politicians in their crosshairs, either 
publicly or quietly. In part because of the Bush White House’s failure 
to fully cooperate in the Justice Department investigation,159 there is 
still insufficient evidence to assess claims that various Democratic 
politicians—including former Governor Don Siegelman of 
Alabama—were targets of politically motivated federal prosecutions 
during the Bush administration.160 The internal Justice Department 
probers did suggest that complaints by New Mexico Republican Party 
stalwarts like Senator Domenici and Representative Heather Wilson 
about the failure of New Mexico U.S. Attorney Iglesias to prosecute 
some Democrats in time for the 2006 elections was a causal factor in 
Iglesias’ termination.161 At least until we are able to distinguish the 
fire from the smoke in other cases in which partisan motivation has 
 
 157. See MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, 
SOLVING PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 109–22 (2000) (exploring the challenges of 
assessing regulatory performance). 
 158. For a rather dated effort by the GAO, as commissioned by Congress, to think 
systematically about federal enforcement, see generally GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MODEL TO ESTIMATE SYSTEM WORKLOAD (1991), available at 
http://archive.gao.gov/d20t9/143920.pdf. 
 159. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, 
at 338 (noting that the White House counsel refused to cooperate with the investigation and 
declined to provide internal documents for review). 
 160. See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 110TH CONG., 
ALLEGATIONS OF SELECTIVE PROSECUTION IN OUR FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10, 
12 (Comm. Print 2008), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/SelProsReport 
080417.pdf. Siegelman’s conviction has been affirmed on appeal, United States v. Siegelman, 
No. 07-13163, 2009 WL 564659, at *29 (11th Cir. Mar. 6, 2009), but the House Judiciary inquiry 
continues. See Adam Nossiter, Judges Uphold Bribery Conviction of a Former Alabama 
Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2008, at A9. 
 161. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22, 
at 168–200. The report recommended that Attorney General Mukasey appoint a special counsel 
to pursue this matter, and he did so. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement by 
Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey on the Report of an Investigation into the Removal of 
Nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006 (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-
opa-859.html. 
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been alleged,162 however, we ought to suspend judgments on 
allegations that have long been a standard defense ploy in public 
corruption cases.163 
One also needs to be careful when considering relations between 
Washington and the districts through the lens of public corruption 
cases. For all the ugliness of partisan targeting allegations, differences 
between the party in power nationally and the party controlling 
locally have played a critical role in making the federal “brand.” For 
better or worse, the rise of federal criminal enforcement as a distinct 
and valuable component of local ecologies, particularly in urban 
areas, owes a lot to disjunctions between those with national political 
power and those who hold sway locally.164 The risk that partisan 
prosecutors with allegiance to the president’s party will target local 
political opponents—either at the behest of the White House or on 
their own—is real. Yet so are the democracy-reinforcing benefits that 
crusading outsiders (who may be insiders vis-à-vis the national party) 
can bring to local politics. The Justice Department rules—already in 
place but beefed up by Attorney General Mukasey165—that require 
local federal elected officials to go through the department’s Office of 
Legislative Affairs, rather than calling U.S. Attorneys directly,166 
should have the salutary effect of both limiting partisan interference 
in specific cases and channeling legislative solicitude for local 
appointees into general support for U.S. Attorney autonomy. But 
 
 162. See, e.g., Sanford C. Gordon, Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Corruption 
Prosecutions 3 (July 21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1166343 (finding evidence of partisan bias under both the George W. Bush and Clinton Justice 
Departments but noting that results may understate extent of bias under Bush while overstating 
it under Clinton). 
 163. See NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, SOME OF IT WAS FUN: WORKING WITH RFK AND 
LBJ 103 (2008) (“Cases involving criminal offenses by public officials are often particularly 
difficult because the press and the public are quick to point out political reasons for prosecuting 
a political opponent or not prosecuting a political friend.”). 
 164. For the fascinating story of how, soon after the creation of the Justice Department in 
1870, federal election law enforcement quickly started to skew away from protecting freedmen 
in the South and toward advancing Republican interests in northern cities, see generally Scott C. 
James & Brian L. Lawson, The Political Economy of Voting Rights Enforcement in America’s 
Gilded Age: Electoral College Competition, Partisan Commitment, and the Federal Election Law, 
93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115 (1999); David Quigley, Constitutional Revision and the City: The 
Enforcement Acts and Urban America, 1870–1894, 20 J. POLICY HIST. 64 (2008). 
 165. See Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys, Communications with the White House 1 (Dec. 19, 
2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ag-121907.pdf. 
 166. For a discussion of departmental efforts to regulate conduct between federal 
prosecutors and political actors, see Beale, supra note 145 (manuscript at 41–60). 
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even with these rules, there is no substitute for a U.S. Attorney in 
whose judgment there is wide, and deserved, confidence, based on a 
long record across cases. 
I hope the Obama administration, working with local legislators, 
picks such people. Moreover, if legislators, deterred from contacting 
U.S. Attorneys directly, want to assess whether the appointees they 
may have helped select are actually playing the roles they are 
supposed to be playing in setting department policy, they might look 
to proxy measures, like how the department is using the Attorney 
General’s Advisory Committee and who is on it. Or they could 
consider the extent to which U.S Attorneys represent the department 
at oversight or other hearings.167 Although one would expect U.S. 
Attorneys to hew to the administration line when they appear as 
departmental witnesses, their appearances are at least some evidence 
that they helped develop that line. Were the major news 
organizations better at covering the interaction between the districts 
and Washington, legislators would not have to work so hard.168 But 
the separation between local and national news beats may have taken 
its toll on the coverage of the U.S. Attorney firings by the national 
news media. It is telling that the best and earliest coverage of the 
story came from a blog. Whether the achievement of “Talking Points 
Memo” (which won a George Polk Award for its coverage)169 offers 
the promise of better external monitoring of the department in the 
future or simply highlights the inadequacies of the print media 
remains to be seen. 
When Attorney General Robert Jackson gave his now-famous 
speech in 1940 to the assembled U.S. Attorneys, he highlighted the 
tension between centralization and local autonomy at the center of 
the federal criminal enforcement bureaucracy: 
  Your responsibility in your several districts for law enforcement 
and for its methods cannot be wholly surrendered to Washington, 
 
 167. See MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL 
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1920–2007: HISTORY, LAW, AND 
PRACTICE 43 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34197.pdf. 
 168. See Nelson W. Polsby, The Political System, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE 
ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION 3, 25 (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008) 
(noting extent to which the American “decision makers in many policy areas” rely “on the 
national news media to send signals among them”). 
 169. See Noam Cohen, Blogger, Sans Pajamas, Racks Muck and a Prize, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
25, 2008, at C1 (noting the award of the George Polk Award for legal reporting to Joshua Micah 
Marshall, creator of Talking Points Memo, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com). 
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and ought not to be assumed by a centralized department of justice. 
It is an unusual and rare instance in which the local district attorney 
should be superseded in the handling of litigation, except where he 
requests help of Washington. It is also clear that with his knowledge 
of local sentiment and opinion, his contact with and intimate 
knowledge of the views of the court, and his acquaintance with the 
feelings of the group from which jurors are drawn, it is an unusual 
case in which his judgment should be overruled. 
  Experience, however, has demonstrated that some measure of 
centralized control is necessary. In the absence of it different district 
attorneys were striving for different interpretations or applications 
of an Act, or were pursuing different conceptions of policy. Also, to 
put it mildly, there were differences in the degree of diligence and 
zeal in different districts. To promote uniformity of policy and 
action, to establish some standards of performance, and to make 
available specialized help, some degree of centralized administration 
was found necessary. 
  Our problem, of course, is to balance these opposing 
considerations. I desire to avoid any lessening of the prestige and 
influence of the district attorneys in their districts. At the same time 
we must proceed in all districts with that uniformity of policy which 
is necessary to the prestige of federal law.170 
This balancing challenge is far greater in 2009 than it was in 1940, 
or even in 1980. The federal docket is larger and federal jurisdiction 
far broader. Perhaps even more significantly, the periphery seems far 
closer to the center. The twenty-four-hour news cycle sparks interest 
from Washington on far more cases. And developments in 
information technology offer the (probably illusionary) promise of 
management from the center. Yet a lot of the wisdom needed in Main 
Justice (and in Congress) lies in understanding how to embrace the 
tensions that Jackson described so well, even while recognizing that 
federal enforcement activity is a scarce and valuable national 
resource. 
 
 170. Robert Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 18 (1940). 
